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THE JUST ECONOMY  
Richard Dien Winfield  
New York/London: Routledge, 1988,252 pp. Hardcover $35.00.  
In this interesting and original book, Winfield argues for five main theses:  
a) The very idea that the economic realm has its own justice (and, hence, 
is a normative sphere with its own rights and obligations) presupposes that 
economic relationships are freely entered. This implies that within a just economy 
human agents can be autonomous: they must be able to determine their needs 
and occupations and have ample opportunity to satisfy their needs through freely 
chosen interactions with others.  
b) Only a market economy can instantiate this idea of economic autonomy 
for all.  
c) A market economy left to itself will eventually lead to unemployment, 
poverty, and other economic situations that are antithetical to universal economic 
autonomy. The just economy is, therefore, a market economy so regulated that 
the conditions of economic autonomy are safeguarded for all. Thus, within the 
just economy, the right to economic self-determination will go hand in hand with 
the (legally enforced) duty to so restrict one's economic activities that everyone 
can enjoy this right.  
d) Although the just economy has its own specific norms, it is part of a 
broader ethical order: the just state as a democratic order. Universal economic 
autonomy should, therefore, be so limited within the just economy that it 
becomes compatible with universal political self-determination.  
e) Among the numerous social and political theorists from Plato to Rawls, 
only Hegel provides "a viable starting point for addressing the just economy," 
although "his efforts are fragmentary and often misguided" (p. 87). (In roughly the 
first third of his book, Winfield briefly criticizes Plato, Aristotle, the classical social 
contractarians, Adam Smith, and Fichte, and deals more extensively with Marx 
and Rawls. In the remainder of the book, Winfield explicates and defends his 
view of the just economy through a reconstruction of Hegel's political economy, 
focussing on the section on Civil Society in the Philosophy of Right.)  
Although thesis (b) is pivotal to Winfield's overall argument, he spends 
little time considering the possibility that a market economy might not be the most 
successful economic arrangement in terms of realizing economic autonomy for 
all. His brief critical discussion of democratic economic planning (see pp. 165-68) 
suffers from posing a false dilemma between a market economy as such and a 
totally planned economy (including the collective assignments of jobs). Also, 
Winfield fails to consider the proposal that economic autonomy might be best 
served by making available to all an increasing number of goods and services 
outside the market of commodoties. Another problem with Winfield's defense of 
thesis (b) is that he does not offer a critical analysis of the kinds of choices that a 
market economy tends to make available. Is it, for example, really the case that 
our economic autonomy increases when we are able to choose between more 
and more brands of the same product? More importantly, Winfield does not 
address the question to what extent we are able to determine our own needs in a 
market economy. Hegel is more critical in this regard: "What the English call 
'comfort' is something inexhaustible and illimitable. [T]he need for greater comfort 
does not exactly arise within you directly; it is suggested to you by those who 
hope to make a profit from its creation" (Philosophy of Right, Addition to Par. 
191).  
It should be noted, however, that Winfield, unlike Hegel, does not seek to 
defend just some approximation of the capitalist market economy. Rather, on 
Winfields's account, it is a matter of economic choice whether family-owned 
businesses, corporations, or labor-managed cooperatives will predominate within 
a just economy. What is only crucial within this economy is that the role of state 
enterprises moves within two limits: state enterprises should not become so 
prevalent that they seriously limit economic of political self-determination, and 
they should at least provide for those goods and services which are in the public 
interest and other enterprises are unwilling to deliver or cannot deliver without 
monopolizing the market (see pp. 222-227). A clear merit of this open-ended 
approach is that Winfield, in his explication of theses (c) and (d), raises important 
problems that pertain to both market capitalism and market socialism, thus 
challenging defenders of either economic system. Moreover, this approach has 
the merit that Winfield's proposals for overcoming these problems, and in 
particular his justification for these proposals, should be of considerable interest 
to proponents of either market capitalism or market socialism. (Some of these 
proposals are that the state must guarantee health care and day care for all, 
provide for job training, and make funds available for political activity and starting 
new economic enterprises.) But the price paid is that the impact of different forms 
of productive property ownership is underestimated. Winfield rightly argues, for 
example, that markest mechanisms generate inequalities in wealth that 
undermine economic and political autonomy for many people, but he pays little 
attention to the fact that this problem seems less severe (and, certainly, takes on 
a different form) in a market economy with predominantly labor-managed 
cooperatives than in a market system in which the means of production are 
primarily individually owned (see pp. 162-63 and 229-31).  
Finally, with regard to thesis (e), it should be noted that Winfield criticized 
not only various aspects of Hegel's political economy, such as its class analysis 
and its understanding of capital, but also gives his own conception of the just 
economy a definite un-Hegelian "activist" dimension. Winfield's sensible 
concluding statement illustrates this latter point: "The just economy is...a product 
of continual political as well as civil vigilance" (p. 232).  
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